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Commentary
The Economic Field and the End  
of Mass Incarceration 
Vincenzo Ruggiero*
Punishment, sPecifically in the form of imPrisonment, has fascinated philosophers, social theorists, and jurists, all striving to determine its functions and legitimacy. In Kant (1797), citizens who commit crime 
lose their dignity, and as a consequence rulers have the right to punish and 
inflict pain upon them. Crime makes an individual a servus in sensu stricto, the 
property of the state. Whereas for Kant the sovereign should be encouraged 
to exercise the right to punish, in Hegel (1896) it is offenders who have a 
right to be punished, in that they are thus honored as rational beings. Any 
attempt to change and rehabilitate them would be patronizing, retribution 
being the only respectful form of dealing with their acts. Retribution returns 
under the guise of vengeance and passion, which characterize punishment 
in Durkheim’s (1924) analysis: in his view, we inflict various degrees of suf-
fering and hardship on offenders not because we may benefit in a material 
sense from it, but to mark the moral strength of a message we intend to 
convey. Crime is functional and useful in that it reinforces the solidarity 
among law-abiding individuals, whereas punishment is not for offenders 
but is a means for boosting the common moral code, the conscience collective. 
Penal reformers may reject retribution and embrace consequentialism, 
positing that human practices are just when they yield actual or expected 
outcomes. From this perspective, punishment as a human action is expected 
to produce good and reduce evil, and as in classical utilitarianism it is 
aimed at increasing happiness while diminishing grief. The most obvious 
social good, for our purposes, is the prevention of criminal activity and 
the reduction of the actual harm caused by it. These may result from the 
deterrent or rehabilitative function of punishment, from general preven-
tion addressed to all, or from the individual preventative measures aimed 
at containing recidivism. 
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Radical reformers, however, mainly adopt two approaches that can be 
broadly distinguished as follows: one emphasizes the institutional function 
of imprisonment, whereas the latter stresses its material function. The first 
is embedded in the notion of retribution and, in its extreme manifestations, 
addresses imprisonment as a means for the destruction of bodies. The second 
looks at prison as a regulatory tool and mainly focuses on the productive 
use of bodies. Of course, analyses adopting a mixed approach are numerous, 
but for the sake of clarity the two positions will be kept theoretically and 
empirically separate (Ruggiero 2010). Founding theorists of the respective 
approaches are Michel Foucault (1977) on the one hand, and Rusche and 
Kirchheimer (1939) on the other. This commentary takes as a starting point 
the work of Rusche and Kirchheimer and tries to update their analysis 
through the concept of economic field, a useful notion for understanding 
the material function of the prison institution in advanced societies. In the 
second part, the analysis proposed is brought to bear on the debate around 
mass incarceration and its alleged end. 
Punishment and Social Structure 
According to Rusche and Kirchheimer, both individual and general deter-
rence pertain to the material sphere of society and are addressed to the 
classes that are the potential clientele of the prison system. The treatment 
of offenders, in other words, is analyzed against the background of the 
productive process and the labor market. Punishment is not eternal or im-
mutable; in fact, “punishment as such does not exist; only concrete systems 
of punishment and specific criminal practices exist” (Rusche & Kirchheimer 
1939, 5). In Rusche and Kirchheimer’s view, changing practices in penal 
systems cannot be explained only in terms of changing needs within the 
war on crime: “Every system of production tends to discover punishments 
which correspond to its productive relationships” (ibid.). It is self-evident, 
they argue, that enslavement as a form of punishment is impossible without 
a slave economy, prison labor is impossible without manufacture or industry, 
and monetary fines are impossible without a money economy. Therefore, 
during depressions and in periods of labor surplus, there is a lowering of 
salaries and a correspondent deterioration of prison conditions. Ideally, 
this surplus labor should be destroyed, as should other commodities whose 
availability on the market is excessive. Consequently, the prison population, 
which is a sector of the surplus labor force, can also be destroyed. Prison 
conditions become more severe because they must be less eligible than the 
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worst possible condition outside (Melossi 1989). Conversely, in periods 
when the commodity labor is scarce, its reproduction becomes of crucial 
importance for the productive process, and as a consequence prison condi-
tions will improve. Even offenders, in such circumstances, will be persuaded 
to become productive.
In periods of economic boom, therefore, “criminals capable of reform” 
are reeducated “with the utmost diligence” (Rusche & Kirchheimer 1968, 
144). Guilty or not, the greatest possible number of them must be given 
back to society as productive forces: “The reformation of convicts is thus 
regarded as a good investment, and not merely as a charitable whim” (ibid.). 
The determination of guilt and the imposition of the sentence become 
separate, as “the first is entrusted to a qualified judge, the second to a social 
physician” (ibid.). Solitary confinement is no longer a major point of discus-
sion, as strict separation at night is “accompanied by organized labor in the 
daytime, made necessary by the requirements of production” (ibid.,154). The 
need to use offenders productively, in certain circumstances, goes as far as 
prompting the mobilization of medical evidence certifying that thieves are, 
in fact, kleptomaniacs. 
The rediscovery of Rusche and Kirchheimer’s work triggered the emer-
gence of analyses focused on the political economy of punishment. In his 
work on immigrants in European prisons, Wacquant (1999) locates minori-
ties at the intersection of three systems of forces that, together, make them 
the foremost targets of penal intervention. These forces are the growth of 
flexible, precarious work; the dismantling of welfare provision; and “the 
crisis of the ghetto as instrument of control and confinement of a stigma-
tized population” (ibid., 215). Prisons, in sum, are seen as instruments for 
the management of poverty and the regulation of the lower segments of 
the labor market. The so-called punitive turn has also been associated with 
“economies of excess” (Hallsworth 2000), the increasing feeling of insecurity 
among some privileged groups (Costelloe et al. 2009, Davis 1998), and the 
mass imprisonment of whole groups of the population (Garland 2001). 
Cultural interpretations of mass imprisonment have been advanced, along 
with studies connecting welfare and punishment. Scholars have also used 
the concept of bureaucratic field, with the argument that the circulation 
of personnel across different institutional areas explains the converging 
dominant ideas around crime and punishment (Wacquant 2009). On the 
other hand, research on migrants and custody has continued with the work 
of, among others, Calavita (2003), De Giorgi (2010), Melossi (2003), and 
Rivera Beiras (2005).
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The End of Mass Incarceration?
Scholarship in the tradition of the political economy of punishment has 
continued its analyses around the role of penal systems in governing social 
marginality and reproducing existing structures of inequality (Cheliotis 
2015, Simon 2014, Wacquant 2009), but it has also explored other areas, 
including racial discrimination and other forms of social oppression (De 
Giorgi 2015c). Examples of intersectionality are therefore found in the 
literature, with research incorporating race, class, and gender and examin-
ing how the justice system embodies, perpetuates, and transforms existing 
social injustices (Potter 2015). 
Despite the constant need in capitalist societies to perpetuate disad-
vantage and reproduce armies of disenfranchised individuals and groups, 
incarceration rates have recently shown some decline, spurring a number 
of possible explanations. Some scholars, for example, have connected recent 
pleas for non-punitive reforms with the injunction of financial austerity 
in all areas of public spending (Aviram 2014). Advocated by progressive 
observers and activists, reform becomes thus inspired by concerns around 
costs and tangible monetary considerations. Critics, however, maintain that 
“such technocratic and market-friendly approaches to the penal crisis” may 
make penal policies less expensive, but not less punitive (De Giorgi 2015a, 
196). A less expensive treatment of offenders, moreover, may result in fewer 
services to them, forcing prisoners and their families to foot the bill of their 
own incarceration. 
Reform based on the costs of imprisonment neglects the fact that a 
“waste” of finances is perfectly justified if needed to maintain the polarized 
distribution of resources at the current levels. Waste is a good investment if 
it sustains a penal system that defends privilege, and it cannot be measured 
with a conventional rational calculus. The costs of penal systems, in other 
words, should be measured against the degree of income differences they 
are supposed to maintain or exacerbate. Where wealth polarization is high 
and the costs of reproducing it are equally high, rational argumentations of a 
mathematical or monetary nature will not be heeded. Penal costs, therefore, 
are those required not for the prevention or punishment of crime but for 
the reproduction of social injustice (Ruggiero 2013a).
The concept of transcarceration may provide another critical perspective 
for the analysis of the current (alleged) decarceration process. Inmates may 
just be dumped into their communities of origin, where they will find a 
variety of other institutions “confining, treating, punishing, and disciplining” 
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them (De Giorgi 2015b, 21). In those communities, they will also find the 
very conditions that led them to illegal activity in the first place. 
It is my contention that, with deprivation remaining the same, we need 
to find other explanations for the alleged crisis of mass incarceration. I sug-
gest that, rather than saving money, reform aims to incorporate a monetary 
logic into the logic of punishment and the rehabilitation of offenders. In this 
sense, mass incarceration has not failed but succeeded, as it has effectively 
“educated” the poor into accepting the “natural” laws of economics. I will 
elaborate on this argument using the concept of economic field.
The Economic Field
The concept of economic field refers to the logic guiding labor markets and 
their shortages or redundancies, but it also incorporates other crucial notions. 
The economic field is connoted by abstract rules that agents observe, follow-
ing a script and obeying to a sense of practice established and judged within 
their own context. The final determination of the correctness of an action is 
based not on whether individuals rigorously followed a rule, but rather on 
whether their actions are interpreted as appropriate by others: “Agents act 
within a fluid context of structure, marked by group expectations, norms of 
acceptable practice, sanctions, and relations of power” (King 2005, 222). In 
prison, sanctions and relations of power forge the inmates into adaptable 
productive agents who are prepared to respond to the flexible necessities of 
the economy. Rusche and Kirchheimer appear to overlook this “educational” 
process, as they describe inmates as a purely passive workforce that is used 
or destroyed according to the requirements of the economic cycle. What 
the concept of economic field alludes to, instead, is the ideological process 
whereby actors challenge rules, use them for their purposes, or internalize 
them.  
The economic field refers to the structure of social relations in which an 
individual is located (Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992, King 2005). This structure 
is independent of the individuals who occupy the field, as it preexists them 
and determines the conflicts arising in it. Imprisoned actors, in other words, 
are immersed in rules and principles that they are expected to reproduce 
while reproducing the institution holding them. They may choose to subvert 
those rules and principles, but their rehabilitation will be deemed complete 
only when they comply, bowing to the hegemonic culture imposed on them.
The educational process alluded to here entails a change in the habitus of 
inmates—that is, a change in their dispositions, comprised of lasting patterns 
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of thought, perception, and behavior (Bourdieu 1980, 1990). Punishment, 
therefore, particularly in the context of imprisonment, acts as an educational 
setting in which judgments of social fitness are made; it is a system of cul-
tural exclusion whose ideal outcome is the production of a coerced homo 
oeconomicus. In brief, prison remodels the habitus o the inmates making 
them fit for the social conditions they will experience once released. 
Against classical rational theory, Bourdieu (2000) sees actors in the 
economic field as the product of their social experiences and the outcome 
of largely unconscious processes that structure their taste, strategies, and 
orientations. This field is formed of constraining frames for individual and 
collective action and is structured by the unequal distribution of symbolic, 
cultural, and social assets. Domination is a central characteristic of the 
economic field, and in prison such domination compels the acceptance of 
economic laws as part of an autonomous game, devoid of ethical rules or 
political concerns. Prisoners who through offending have allegedly violated 
those laws undergo a form of treatment that ought to guide them toward 
embracing them.
An Invisible Curriculum
The homo oeconomicus forged in prison is required to learn the “universal” 
principles that guide behavior in the marketplace and that make economics 
a religion. There is a hidden curriculum in the learning process conveyed 
by incarceration, an element of Bildung based on classic and contemporary 
economic doctrines. The catechism and eternal truths conveyed by economics 
translate perfectly into disciplinary philosophies incorporated in punish-
ment. Let us see some examples. 
In Adam Smith, justice is violated when individuals are injured as individu-
als, as members of a family, or as members and citizens of a state. Violations 
may undermine our natural rights, for example the right of liberi commercii, 
namely the right to exchange goods and services with those who are willing 
to deal with us. Those who hamper such a right violate what Smith terms 
iura perfecta, “rights that we have a title to demand and, if refused, to compel 
another to perform” (Smith 1762–63, 8). Iura imperfecta, conversely, pertain 
to expectations, to duties that might be performed by others for our benefit, 
but which we have no entitlement to nor can we compel others to perform: 
“Thus, a man of bright parts or remarkable learning is deserving of praise, 
but we have no power to compel any one to give it him” (ibid., 9). Similarly, 
inactive individuals such as beggars may be the objects of our charity and may 
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be assumed to have a right to demand it, but we are not compelled to share 
our wealth with them. Moreover, inactive people, included the unemployed, 
are regarded as unable to develop feelings of cooperation and solidarity due 
to their lack of involvement in the economy. Following Smith, therefore, we 
may assert that imprisoned individuals must not expect any support, which 
would fall under the rubric of iura imperfecta, until they join the ranks of 
the employed. Only then will their anti-social behavior be tempered by the 
economic dynamic itself, which performs a crucial educational function by 
making that behavior counterproductive and transforming selfishness into 
its opposite: that is to say, regard and consideration for others. 
This general principle should be examined alongside Smith’s more specific 
views around unemployment. The jobless, in his formulation, should wait for 
the employment opportunities created by the emergence of new productive 
activities or the recovery of old ones; only then, once in the labor market, 
the solidarity and respect for others produced by their involvement in the 
economy will turn their “private selfishness into public altruism” (ibid., 3). 
However, the reality in contemporary advanced societies is that job op-
portunities for the marginalized who constitute the clientele of the prison 
system are mainly found in the parallel economy and its hidden sectors. 
Therefore, following Smith’s doctrine, we can suggest that the economic 
field operating in prison institutions trains individuals to accept the flexible 
and underpaid jobs available to them in the parallel economy. 
The invisible curriculum adopted by prison institutions contains other 
elements derived from economic doctrines. Think of Marshall’s (1890) mar-
ginalist analysis, in which he develops a conceptual apparatus around wages 
and work conditions. He considers the case of people being out of work 
for some time: would they accept lower wages for a new job or not? Here, 
Marshall introduces the concept of the marginal disutility of labor: “As with 
every increase in the amount of a commodity its marginal utility falls… so 
the marginal disutility of labor generally increases with every increase in its 
amount” (Marshall 1890, 117). Like other commodities, labor can come in 
alternative forms, and according to the principle of substitution, new ma-
chineries can replace workers. Labor can also become cheaper, particularly 
when contingent social circumstances make it widely available. It is true, 
as Smith (1776, 93) indicates, that where wages are high workers are more 
“active, diligent and expeditious.” However, alert businessmen will always 
seek the most profitable application of their resources, making use of each 
agent of production up to the point where its marginal utility is inferior to 
the utility of other agents. 
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In this respect, Marshall (1890) invites us to suppose the case of a 
farmer who is uncertain whether to employ an extra shepherd or not. He 
will, Marshall suggests, if the potential employee is the marginal shepherd, 
namely the extra unit of labor whose productivity is matched by the salary 
received. In Marshall’s words, the marginal application of an extra unit of 
labor is viable when “the net product of an additional man would more than 
cover his wages” (ibid., 427). This additional man can be called a marginal 
man, because his employment is marginal. In brief, “the wages of every class 
of labor tend to be equal to the net product due to the additional labor of 
the marginal laborer of that class” (ibid., 429). 
Marginal workers constitute a serious contemporary concern and typify 
sectors of economies across the world. According to Marshall, wages are 
determined by the expectations of the last remaining person prepared 
to accept them. Such person is identified by Marshall as one who holds 
“slender means” and low education and possesses a particular “weakness in 
distinctly realizing the future”; this person’s children will be “imperfectly 
fed and clothed,” housed in a way that promotes “neither physical no moral 
health,” and they will “have few opportunities of getting a broader view of 
life” or an insight “into the nature of the higher work of business, of sci-
ence or of art”; finally, these persons “meet hard and exhausting toil early 
on the way, and for the greater part keep to it all their lives…. They go to 
the grave carrying with them undeveloped abilities and faculties” (Marshall 
1890, 467–69). However, responsibility for these conditions is not laid at 
the door of employers, who choose these workers for their low cost, but at 
the door of well-paid laborers who request yet better pay. These Marshallian 
principles implicitly inform the educational content of incarceration and 
shape the expectations of those released from custody.
Neoliberal doctrines are included in this custodial invisible curriculum, 
particularly the idea whereby rules of conduct develop not because they 
permit the achievement of a known purpose but because the groups prac-
ticing them are successful in competing with others and defeating them. 
Employers paying poor wages are among these successful groups, and the 
rules of the victors will become part of the natural, spontaneous order con-
noting the “Great Society” (Hayek 1973). In brief, social arrangements are 
the outcome of previous actions guiding individuals and groups in their 
struggle for survival and evolution, and as such they are not subject to moral 
evaluation. Even when such arrangements are unequal, change will result 
not from forces acting outside of society but from endogenous factors that 
will spontaneously rectify the apparent injustice. In sum, spontaneous order 
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(i.e., the market) cannot be replaced by organization (i.e., state intervention). 
As in the liberalist tradition as a whole, the thaumaturgic force amending 
injustice and benefiting all will spontaneously evolve from the pursuit of 
self-interest (Ruggiero 2013b).
Hayek (1944, 151–52) advocates submission to the impersonal forces of 
the market, an act of faith to be conducted with “a religious spirit of humil-
ity.” Although he rejects the “exaggerated respect for the crude teachings of 
the early economists,” and although it is “rationally difficult to comprehend 
the necessity of submitting to forces whose operation we cannot follow in 
detail” (ibid.), in his view trust in the market has made possible the growth 
of a society that otherwise would not have developed. In sum, the respect 
we owe to economic doctrines is akin to the humble awe inspired by reli-
gion. In this way, neoliberalism associates freedom with incessant growth, 
it rejects state intervention in the economy as dysfunctional and despotic, 
and it advocates vagueness and mutability of norms and laws in conformity 
with the needs of those operating in the market (Ruggiero 2013b). 
Carceral Social Zones      
When such education delivered in custody is successful, we should expect a 
very different outcome from the one described by Rusche and Kirchheimer. 
This is because the material function of imprisonment has drastically changed. 
We can still employ the term “material” because it conjures up a notion of 
productivity, but this should not be assimilated to the notion of the work-
house nor with that of “prison as factory” of early capitalism (Melossi & 
Pavarini 1977). Prisoners’ work and exploitation mainly take place beyond 
the prison walls, notably in those social areas where marginalized activities 
and precarious jobs intermingle with overtly illegal endeavors. We could 
term these areas “carceral social zones” and suggest that they are the object 
of a variety of forms of control and punishment, including, when softer 
methods prove ineffective, the threat of physical and mental destruction. In 
such areas, the deterrent role of punishment is directed not only at repeat 
or unmanageable offenders but also at the excluded population in general.
Carceral social zones host a mixture of official and illegal activities and 
witness a constant flow of commodities and services whose nature may be 
legal or otherwise. In such areas, “crime as work” means that poorly paid jobs, 
unregistered jobs, underemployment, and criminal activity proper are not 
part of an exclusive occupational choice. Here people “commute” from one 
activity to the other, and in doing so expose themselves to the institutional as 
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well as the material aspects of punishment. To remark that those inhabiting 
these areas are met with increasing punitive measures is to provide a partial 
picture of the relationship between punishment and the material condition 
of those punished; in other words, the concept of repression is insufficient, 
as it leaves out the educational content of state intervention.
Rusche and Kirchheimer’s model does hardly apply to the carceral social 
zones, in that such zones do not display the conventional traits of labor 
markets. Even if we adopted a “long cycle” or “long wave” view of economic 
development and incarceration, the problems would persist, because in the 
carceral social zones unemployment, semi-employment, underemployment, 
and illegal work coexist, at times within the same person. On the other hand, 
however, it is important to note that in these areas the educational or mate-
rial functions of punishment do not cease to be exercised. The marginalized, 
the unemployed, the occasional workers, the petty criminals, and all the 
others whose lifestyle and economic activity straddle legality and illegality 
are trained to remain and survive in their areas of exclusion, just like their 
counterparts in the past centuries were trained to the discipline of industri-
alism. Prison discipline aims at lowering the prisoners’ social expectations, 
an aspect that leads us back to the concept of rehabilitation. Prisoners are 
deemed rehabilitated when they accept to remain in the specific sector of 
the labor force and in the carceral zone assigned to them.
In the end, the slowing down of the process of mass incarceration is 
connected to the successful educational role played by custody. Even conflict 
and violence within prison institutions act as exercises in individualism, 
pure expressions of private interest; drug use in custody, on the other hand, 
intensifies consumerism and determines the internalization of the market 
logic, of its competitiveness. Ultimately, the educated offenders will have 
accepted their role and reduced their expectations, a process that limits them 
to the poor prospects offered by precarious and irregular occupations. The 
costs of mass imprisonment, in this sense, are compensated by the costs 
saved by the employers who will offer such irregular occupations. 
Conclusion
There is a punitive aspect in economic failure, particularly in contexts in 
which success is intensely lauded and rewarded. Economic failure that 
turns into crime is doubly punished, in that it signals an unwillingness to 
interiorize the logic of exchange, costs, benefits, available assets, and unequal 
distribution. Prison institutions are charged with imparting on the inmates 
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an invisible curriculum inspired by neoliberal economic doctrines. In this 
light, I surmise that the end (or decline) of mass incarceration may well be 
due to the temporary success of custody in the production of what I called 
the coerced homo oeconomicus.
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